We examine the role of non-economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with such non-economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non-economic relationships. We present a theoretical model of these ideas, and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross-section of data on international crossholdings of assets and environmental treaties. Our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange.
Introduction
Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions.
Some interactions are strictly economic; for instance, countries engage in international trade of goods, services, capital, and labor. But many are not economic, at least not in any narrow sense.
For instance, the United States seeks to promote human rights and democracy, deter nuclear proliferation, stop the spread of narcotics, and so forth. Accordingly America, like other countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy objectives; it has joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we concentrate on the interesting and understudied case of international environmental arrangements (IEAs). We ask whether participation in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The answer, in both theory and practice, is positive.
Memberships in IEAs yield costs and benefits. A country can gain directly from such interactions; its air might be cleaner, or there might be more fish in the sea. However, some gains can be indirect. For instance, countries with long horizons and low discount rates might be more willing both to protect the environment and to maintain a reputation as a good credit risk.
If they can signal their discount rate through IEA activity, participation in IEAs may indirectly yield gains from improvements in credit terms. Alternatively, countries that are tightly tied into a web of international relationships may find that withdrawing from one domain (such as environmental cooperation), may adversely affect activities in an unrelated area (such as finance). The fear of these spillovers may then encourage good behavior in the first area.
Our theoretical analysis begins with an extension of the "reputation spillover" concept introduced by Cole and Kehoe (1997) . In our model, countries -or rather, their policymakers -differ in their attractiveness as borrowers. Formally, we model these differences as differing discount rates among borrowing country governments, but one could envision alternative differences, such as disparities across countries in the perceived cost of default on external debt obligations. We concentrate on the example of discount rate differences in our theoretical model for analytical tractability, but we do not intend to suggest that this is the only source of heterogeneity in creditworthiness across countries.
With differing discount rates, more patient governments choose to join a greater number of environmental treaties; this sends a credible signal concerning a country's debt capacity.
Creditors respond by lending the country more capital. The predictions of this model are multilateral, since membership in IEAs is easily-accessible common knowledge. A country that joins more IEAs enhances its reputation with all nations. This multilateral model is an intuitive start. Still, it misses the possibility that membership in an IEA may confer special advantages to its members; if Argentina defaults on its Brazilian debt, Brazil can retaliate by failing to support Argentine environmental initiatives. We thus extend the model to accommodate bilateral spillovers. We allow a creditor to respond to default by reducing the debtor's gains from involvement in mutual IEAs. 1 This extended model demonstrates that cross-country economic interaction can be a function of solo and/or joint participation in environmental treaties. Succinctly: the more international environmental commitments that countries make individually and in common, the easier is economic exchange between the countries. 2 We then take these ideas to the data. Using a cross-sectional gravity model to control for other phenomena, we find that participation in IEAs is indeed positively associated with the international exchange of assets. This confirms the notion of positive spillovers between environmental cooperation and economic exchange. Moreover, we find that multilateral IEA participation is not a sufficient statistic to explain bilateral economic exchange; joint IEA participation is also related to asset cross-holdings. We corroborate these findings using a panel of data that includes bank loans and FDI. We use a number of instrumental variables to show that our empirical results do not depend on the assumption that causality flows simply from environmental engagement to economic exchange. Our empirics thus support our extended model with both a reputation effect and some sort of bilateral punishment mechanism.
A brief survey of the literature section is provided in section 2, while our theoretical framework is developed in the following section. The empirical work is presented in section 4.
The paper ends with a brief conclusion.
Literature Survey
The concept of reputation spillovers arose as a response to the Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) challenge to the sovereign debt literature. In their seminal paper, Bulow and Rogoff cast doubt on the possibility of sustainable sovereign lending based solely on the desire of borrowers to maintain their reputations. They demonstrated that such relationships would not be sustainable, because a borrower would eventually prefer to default on its debt and "self-finance" its consumption-smoothing.
This challenge was addressed in a series of papers by Cole and Kehoe (1995 . They show that the problem with reputation-based borrowing stems from the fact that a borrower able to replicate interactions with other creditors receives only transient benefits from such relationships. At some point, the benefits of maintaining a reputation fall sufficiently that default and subsequent self-finance is the rational response. However, Cole and Kehoe (1995) show that the desire to maintain other interactions with creditor nations may support debt, provided that these other relationships are not transient but enduring. Cole and Kehoe (1998) demonstrate that the desire to maintain reputations in enduring relationships can support a debt relationship with transient benefits. Cole and Kehoe (1997) show that the desire to maintain an enduring relationship can support a transient debt relationship in a simple trigger-strategy model, where a creditor responds to default by breaking off debtor relationships with enduring benefits.
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We borrow this modeling strategy below in our theoretical work.
Other signals of creditworthiness have also been examined in the literature. Milde and Riley (1988) argue that borrowers can signal the quality of underlying investments through the magnitude of borrowing. Alternatively, borrowers may resume payments subsequent to default, either to affect bargaining negotiations (e.g. Gale and Hellwig, 1989) or to signal government stability (e.g., Cole, Dow, and English, 1995) . Similarly, creditworthy borrowers may signal their types by pursuing fiscal contractions (e.g. Drudi and Prati, 2000) , enduring costly recessions prior to defaulting, as in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) , or by accepting rescheduling packages at tough terms as in Spiegel (2005) .
On the other hand, default decisions can themselves be signals of other types of information. Sandleris (2006) develops a model where government default decisions provide information about economic fundamentals that affect private sector behavior. He shows that the desire to signal to the domestic private sector that fundamentals are good can be sufficient to generate lending in an environment without default penalties.
A different literature of relevance concerns the formation and characteristics of IEAs; references here include Barrett (1994) , Siniscalco (1998), and Finus et al (2005) .
Most of the literature is skeptical about the ability of voluntary self-enforcing IEAs to improve on non-cooperative outcomes. The intuition is that the level of any attainable environmental objective -say, abatement of a certain pollutant -is limited in a heterogeneous group by the preferences of the nation least interested in the problem. While there has been some discussion about encouraging greater participation in IEAs through cooperation in other dimensions such as R&D activity (e.g., Carrero and Siniscalco, 1997), the literature is discouraged by the fact that such agreements are not explicitly found in practice (Barrett, 2003) .
Self-enforcing IEAs among proximate countries might be better able to achieve superior outcomes if pollution spillovers are decreasing in distance [e.g. Davies and Naughton (2006) ].
However, our analysis abstracts from geographic effects on the benefits of IEAs. 
Economic Interaction and Participation in IEAs

Pure reputation model
We begin with a reputation-based model, where a government's decision to engage in IEAs enhances the ability of private entrepreneurs to acquire portfolio investment from abroad,
since it credibly signals a lower discount rate.
We model our analysis in terms of a representative host country. We assume that each host country is endowed with x units of a perishable good in each period, 0,1,..., t = ∞. There are K foreign countries in the model. We assume that there are a large number of atomistic foreign investors in a representative foreign country k that are willing to extend credit to the host country firms, so long as the expected rate of return is greater than or equal to the risk free rate. 5 For simplicity, all bonds are assumed to be one-period, and are in the form of portfolio investments that are extended in period 1 t − and come due in period t . As borrowers in the host country are limited to a credit ceiling that precludes default in equilibrium, competition among investors from country k ensures that the nominal rate of return is equal to the risk free rate, which we designate as * r . A national government maximizes its citizens' discounted utility, subject to the government's discount rate, β . Utility satisfies
A continuum of categories of environmental issues J is distributed on the interval [0, ] J with each category covered by an IEA with density ( ) f j , which we refer to interchangeably as a "treaty." A treaty requires participants to contribute a fixed amount of their consumption good e in each period (including period 0) towards improving the environment. IEA j then yields a benefit, j v , in each of the following periods 0 t > . We number the treaties such that We assume that a treaty is void when one of the signatories shirks, and that the shirker suffers a fixed penalty of φ each following period.
Private international investments are subject to sovereign risk. We assume that the sovereign makes a repayment decision concerning whether or not to service the nation's outstanding private debt requirements and the private debtors in the borrowing nation comply with the sovereign's decision. Default is selective, in that the sovereign makes its default decision on debt obligations to each nation separately. 6, 7 The timing of the model is as follows. In period 0, the government receives its endowment, and then chooses * j , the number of IEAs to join. It then chooses whether or not to comply with the terms of these treaties and spends e if it complies. Next, investors in each country k choose t ω , the aggregate amount of credit to extend to private borrowers in the host country. Finally production occurs, followed by agents in the host country consuming the unused portion of their endowment.
In subsequent periods, the government again decides whether to comply (or not) with the treaty. In addition, it decides whether or not to announce a general default, and the foreign investors choose the amount of new credit to extend to host country borrowers. Finally, agents in the host country produce and consume, subject to any penalties for default or shirking on their environmental commitments.
To insure sub-game perfection, we solve the model backwards, beginning in a representative period 1 t ≥ . Initially, we treat default and IEA penalties as separate; below, we also consider an extension which allows punishment through environmental treaties.
Consumption by country i in period 0 t > is equal to the country's endowment, plus the net gains from production (the value of output minus debt service) and environmental improvement, minus any penalties incurred for debt default or shirking on IEA commitments:
where: % j ν represents the net payoff from participation in treaty j (which equals j e ν − under compliance, and φ − under non-compliance), and t d represents the individual firm's debt service payment, which equals * t r ω under debt service, and 0 under default.
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Given debt service, the representative country continues to obtain funds from all k countries in each period in the future. Discounted utility under compliance with both signed treaties and debt obligations satisfies:
We first examine the choice of how many IEAs to join. Under compliance, the host country gives effort in every period (spends e), beginning with period 0, and receives j v in every period beginning with period 1. Discounted utility in period 0 from joining and complying with debt and treaty obligations satisfies ( ) ( )
Maximizing 0 U with respect to * j , the host country chooses * j such that
The discounted utility from violating the marginal treaty in some future period
By (3) and (6) ( )
when (5) is satisfied. It follows that the debtor will choose ex post to comply with treaties that are voluntarily signed.
We next turn to the default decision. The marginal decision is whether or not to default on credit obligations to any single country k . In the event of such a default, we assume that it loses access private capital flows from that country in the future. Discounted utility subsequent to default on credit obligations to country k satisfies ( ) ( ) ( )
By (3) and (8), the representative country will choose to default unless
where an interior solution requires the parameter restriction ' * 0 y r β − < , which we adopt.
Substituting (5) into (9) and totally differentiating with respect to * j and ω yields ( ) ( )
since the denominator will be negative in the range where entrepreneurs in the host country are credit constrained.
Equation (10) indicates that the credit ceiling will be a function of the creditor's perception of the discount rate of the host country government. That is, the number of IEAs in which a country participates provides a signal of its discount rate and thus influences its credit ceiling. Succinctly, the model implies that higher international environmental involvement is associated with more international exchange of credit.
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Addition of bilateral penalties
The prediction of the analysis above is multilateral; when Ruritania signs its IEAs, all its potential sources of capital see this signal. We now add bilateral linkages across countries, consistent with the framework of Cole and Kehoe (1997) . We assume that if Ruritania defaults, its creditors punish it in the environmental sphere. We then demonstrate that this possibility increases economic integration over and above the level sustained through multilateral IEA membership. In the next section, we take this prediction to the data to verify the empirical importance of spillovers across different forms of interaction.
Formally, we specify the bilateral punishment to debt default as reducing the net gains in each period from membership in IEAs in which both countries i and k are members by some fractionγ , 0 1 γ < ≤ , so that the gains from being in treaty j are equal to ( )( would involve a "grim strategy," where the creditor nation responds to a default by its debtor by rescinding the treaty altogether. For simplicity, we assume that the value of γ is constant across countries.
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Define m as the highest-numbered treaty in which both countries participate. With the addition of the bilateral treaty-based default penalty, the value of discounted utility under default
where j ϕ is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if j m ≤ , and value 0 otherwise.
By (3) and (11), the credit constraint from country k now satisfies
Comparing (12) and (9), it can be seen that the capacity to levy bilateral environmental treaty penalties under default eases the credit ceiling faced by country k . Moreover, the host country government will again choose * j such that (7) is still binding. Substituting and totally differentiating (13) with respect to ω and * j yields
Comparing (13) to (10), it can be seen that if * 1, Our theory therefore yields two nested predictions. The pure reputation model implies that the magnitude of flows from a source to the host country will be increasing in the total number of environmental treaties in which that country is a member. The bilateral punishment model also predicts that the magnitude of portfolio flows will be increasing in the number of jointly held treaties. In the following section, we test these predictions empirically.
Empirics
We think of the model above as illustrative rather than one to be taken literally. We have made a host of assumptions to keep the model stripped down to its bare essentials. For instance, the model assumes: no production or uncertainty, much symmetry, limited interactions between countries, and so forth. We think the analysis points to two key predictions. First, a country's non-economic commitments (which we model as the number of IEAs in which a country participates) should have a positive effect on its ability to conduct international economic exchange (which we model as international portfolio holdings). Second, bilateral non-economic interactions may also matter; the level of multilateral IEA participation may not be a sufficient statistic for the level of environmental engagement. The number of IEAs common to both countries is also relevant to their bilateral economic interactions if there are "bilateral penalties."
We now take these predictions to the data.
4A. Specification
Our pure reputation model predicts that the level of international asset cross-holdings between two nations will be increasing in the number of IEAs in which each of them participates, while the extended bilateral penalty model also predicts that the number of IEAs in which they are joint members is relevant. Our goal in this section is to check these predictions.
Our empirical specification of international cross-holdings of assets is a generalization of the standard bilateral "gravity" model. While gravity specifications have been primarily applied to bilateral trade patterns, they have also been shown to explain bilateral financial flows surprisingly well [e.g. Spiegel (2004, 2007) and Portes and Rey (2005) ]. Since transportation costs of moving assets are likely to be negligible, motivations for gravity specifications of financial flows in the literature have concentrated on information asymmetries.
A theoretical justification for a gravity model for financial flows has been provided by Martin and Rey (2000) , who develop a model of trade between countries with endogenously supplied assets that are imperfectly substitutable. International trade in these assets entails "iceberg"
transactions costs that are increasing in the distance between the country where the asset is issued (which is also the location of the underlying real activity being financed) and the country where the asset is purchased. Martin and Rey argue that these costs capture a number of costs associated with international asset transactions, including banking commissions and fees, transactions fees associated with currency exchange, exposure to currency risk, and information costs.
Our specification satisfies: 
where i denotes the host country, j denotes the source country, and the variables are defined as:
• ij A denotes asset cross-holdings held in host country i and sourced from j , measured in (millions of US) dollars,
RTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement and zero otherwise,
• ij CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t,
Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language,
Area is the total area of i ,
Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border,
Landl is a binary variable which is unity if country i is land-locked,
Island is a binary variable which is unity if country i is an island nation,
Comcol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer,
IEA is the number of environmental treaties that i has ratified at t,
IEA is the number of environmental treaties that i and j have both ratified at t,
• β is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and
• ε ij represents the other influences on bilateral credit, assumed to be well behaved.
The coefficients of interest to us are { } γ . γ 1 represents the effect on international economic exchange of host country i's participation in international environmental treaties; γ 2 is the analogous effect of joint IEA participation by i and j.
4B. Data
Our regressand is asset cross-holdings. ENTRI provides data for individual countries on: 1) which agreements the country has signed (so that a country is a "signatory" to a treaty); 2) which agreements are in force (where the country is a "party" to an agreement); as well as 3) agreements denounced (so that the country is a "former party" to a treaty). There are only a small number of the latter; almost one hundred countries have not denounced any agreements (the United States has denounced three agreements; and the United Kingdom has denounced the largest number of treaties, ten). importance. We consider a more careful weighting of participation in different treaties to be an interesting topic for future work. 16 Descriptive statistics for the key variables are presented in Table A2 . Table A3 contains simple bivariate correlations between the key variables of interest. The regressors of interest are all positively correlated with the regressands.
4C. Results
We begin by estimating our default equation with least squares, using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. 17 Since our measure of a country's international environmental commitment is both measured with error and potentially simultaneously determined with asset flows, we also take instrumental variable results seriously; more on this later.
Our benchmark OLS results are presented in Table 1 . The first column presents a specification in which only there are no environmental treaties entered at all. The next two columns add: first, the number of treaties to which each of the host and source countries separately belong (multilateral measures); and second, the number of environmental treaties to which both countries belong (a bilateral measure). The most important column is that on the right, which includes both the bilateral and multilateral measures of environmental treaties.
While the control variables are not of direct interest, it is reassuring to see that the default gravity model seems to work well. Countries that are further apart have fewer asset crossholdings, while countries with greater economic mass (as measured by GDP) have more.
Holding GDP constant, countries with larger population (i.e., lower GDP per capita) exchange fewer assets. A number of sensible features seem to raise cross-holdings, including a common language, currency, land border, colonizer or regional trade agreement. Some of the purely geographic features (the physical size of a country, whether it is landlocked, and whether it is an island nation) also matter. The equation fits well, with an impressive R 2 of .61 on a purely crosssectional basis.
Is there space for environmental commitment to matter above and beyond these factors?
Yes. Both the multilateral and bilateral number of environmental commitments have a positive effect on asset cross-holdings. If one examines the column on the extreme right (which gives the weakest results since it examines multilateral and bilateral effects simultaneously), for each additional jointly signed environmental treaty, asset cross-holdings by .03%. This effect is small but plausible, and statistically significant at any reasonable confidence level. If a pair of countries were to move from the 25 th percentile (with 7 jointly signed environmental treaties) to the 75 th percentile (with 54 joint treaties) holding other factors constant, asset cross-holdings would be expected to rise by around 1.5%. Similarly, the effect of a host country's environmental commitment also has a small positive and statistically significant effect on asset holdings; a one standard deviation increase in the number of environmental treaties signed raises asset cross-holdings by around .65%.
We consider our OLS results to be basically supportive of the idea that non-economic partnerships play a small but positive role in supporting economic exchanges such as international cross-holdings of assets. Moreover, as we find that both multilateral and joint IEA memberships are significantly positive, the results appear to support some level of bilateral punishment as well.
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Instrumental Variables
While we find our OLS results promising, we are reluctant to rely completely on them for at least two reasons. First, there is potential cause for concern with simultaneity. Participation in an environmental treaty requires a near-term sacrifice (for instance, the adherence costs associated with pollution abatement) for a stream of future benefits (associated with a more sustainable environment). Similarly, servicing international debt obligations also requires a short-term sacrifice for a long-term benefit. Both phenomena therefore involve a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of honoring long-run agreements; thus at some deep level, the two phenomena share important features. 19 Measurement error is also a potentially serious issue, since a simple summation of the number of active environmental treaties in which a country is participating is a noisy indicator of its international environmental commitments. 20 As our default we use two instrumental variables for the number of environmental agreements (we also experiment with other choices to check the robustness of our results). The first is the country's "polity" score, taken from the Polity IV data set. 21 This is a score that measures the political nature of the country. It is available for 161 countries annually through 2003; the score for an individual country during a given year ranges from -10 (a high autocracy such as Qatar or Saudi Arabia) through 10 (a high democracy such as Australia or Austria). We think of this instrumental variable as desirable since more democratic political regimes are likely to have longer time horizons.
Our second instrumental variable is more directly tied to environmental considerations.
We use the "Environmental Sustainability Index" (ESI), which was developed for the World
Economic Forum by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for
International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University, and is available for up to 145 countries for 2001 and 2002. 22 The ESI is described by its creators as "a measure of overall progress towards environmental sustainability." A high ESI rank indicates that a country has achieved a higher level of environmental sustainability than most other countries; a low ESI rank signals that a country is facing substantial problems in achieving environmental sustainability along multiple dimensions. In 2001, the three countries with the highest and lowest ESI scores were Finland, Norway and Canada, and Haiti, Saudi Arabia, and Burundi respectively.
The ESI was designed to permit systematic quantitative international comparisons of environmental progress. It models environmental sustainability as a function of five phenomena: a) the state of the environmental systems, such as air, soil, ecosystems and water; b) the stresses on those systems, in the form of pollution and exploitation levels; c) the human vulnerability to environmental change in the form of loss of food resources or exposure to environmental diseases; d) the social and institutional capacity to cope with environmental challenges; and finally e) the ability to respond to the demands of global stewardship by cooperating in collective efforts to conserve international environmental resources such as the atmosphere.
Accordingly, the ESI was constructed by aggregating five "core components" which each measure one of these phenomena; we also use the three most relevant of its components as instrumental variables for sensitivity analysis. These measure: 1) environmental systems; 2) environmental stress; and 3) human vulnerability to the environment.
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We think of the ESI and its underlying components as providing measures of actual and potential environmental damage. These are plausibly correlated with participation in environmental treaties because countries with more pollution are plausibly more sensitive to environmental costs and thus more likely to engage in IEAs; similarly, countries with greater potential losses from environmental degradation. These environmental measures do not seem closely related to a country's willingness to services its international debt, especially if they are caused by long-term geographic or historical features. However, we also examine alternative instrumental variables below.
Our IV results are presented in Table 2 , which is formatted similarly to Table 1 .
Reassuringly, both coefficients of interest remain positive and statistically significant when estimated with IV. Indeed, consistent with the notion of either attenuation and/or simultaneity bias, the coefficients are even larger. The effect of joint environmental treaties has almost doubled while the effect of a host country's environmental treaties has more than quintupled! 25 We tend to act conservatively in our interpretation and thus try not to take these magnitudes too literally, especially given that the precision of the estimates has deteriorated. 26 Still, it seems reasonable to conclude that our positive OLS results do not stem simply from a flawed estimation strategy.
We check the sensitivity of our results further in Table 3 . We pursue three types of robustness checks: 1) moving from time-averaged to annual data; 2) changing the instrumental variables; and 3) taking into account regional effects.
We are comfortable with our strategy of averaging our three years of data into a single cross-section. The span of the data is short so that the observations are highly dependent, and some country-pairs are not available for every year. Still, panel estimation is technically feasible. Accordingly, we estimated our equation by pooling our annual cross-sections, including year effects. The OLS and IV results are tabulated in the first two rows of Table 3 .
They indicate that our key finding of positive and significant effects of the number of both multilateral and joint (bilateral) environmental treaties on asset cross-holdings is robust to using pooled annual instead of a single cross-section of data.
The next rows experiment with the exact choice of instrumental variables. First, we substitute the three most plausible components of the ESI ("environmental systems,"
"environmental stress," and "human vulnerability") for the portmanteau ESI measure itself. 27 Our two key coefficients of interest are still positive and significant when we follow this estimation strategy. Finally, γ 1 loses its statistical significance when we add three regional dummies (one for observations where either country is African; another for observations where either country is either Latin American or Caribbean; and a third where either country is Asian). On the other hand, the key multilateral effect remains positive and significant when regional dummies are included.
We conclude from all this that our finding of a positive and significant effect of IEA engagement on international cross-holdings of assets, is not particularly sensitive to the exact details of our econometric machinery.
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4D. A Different Data Set
The CPIS data set used above corresponds to the international exchange of assets that we model in our theoretical section. However, it is most appropriately used as a single crosssection. This precludes employing panel data techniques, which might provide a sharper estimate of the effect of environmental engagement on economic exchange.
Accordingly, and for additional sensitivity analysis, we now examine a different data set, drawn from the BIS. This data set has strengths; it is an annual panel that stretches back to 1983, with over 40,000 observations that cover 25 source countries (or territories) and 205 host countries. It has weaknesses; it covers only bilateral consolidated international banking claims, and thus ignores many international assets exchanges. 31 We supplement the banking data (which forms our regressand) with controls derived from the WDI (population and real GDP); ENTRI provides us with data on environmental treaties.
Using the notation of equation (15) This is a relatively conventional gravity equation; a number of the more conventional bilateral controls (such as distance or common language) are excluded since we include a comprehensive set of both (dyadic) country-pair-specific fixed effects, {φ ij }, as well as a comparable set of time-specific effects, {δ t }. Thus, we present "within" estimates that rely only on time-series variation in the effect of changes in treaty obligations on international banking claims, holding constant country size, income, and all features common to time or country-pairs.
Default estimates of {γ} are presented in the top rows of Table 4 . There are three rows:
the first only allows for joint effects of environmental engagement on economic exchange, the second only allows the unilateral effects, while the last allows for both. In our cross-sectional work of Tables 1-3, we found that both bilateral and unilateral effects seem to matter, and this finding also characterizes the panel results of Table 4 . Indeed, each of the effects is positive and statistically significant at conventional significance levels; countries that participate in more treaties either by themselves or with others also enjoy greater international banking activity. We find the consistency of these panel results with the earlier cross-sectional CPIS results encouraging, especially given that they rely only on within-dyad (time-series) variation. Table 4 also has contains four types of sensitivity analysis. First, we use country-specific random effects instead of fixed effects. As a second check, we replace the (dyadic) pair-specific fixed effects in (16) with a comprehensive set of (unilateral) country-specific fixed effects.
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Third, we estimate our equation with instrumental variables in place of OLS. 33 Fourth, in place of using banking claims as our regressand, we merge in and substitute the stock of FDI stocks using OECD data. 34 Most of these exercises show that our results are robust; in a few cases, the results are not statistically distinguishable from zero. In no case do environmental treaties enter with a significantly negative coefficient, either unilaterally or bilaterally. Overall, we find the panel data results consistent with our cross-sectional analysis and at least moderately reassuring.
We conclude from all this that there indeed seems to be a link between environmental engagement -as proxied through environmental treaty obligations -and international exchanges of assets. Moreover, this link appears to reflect both overall and joint IEA participation, suggesting that both the pure reputation and bilateral punishment channels for reputation spillovers play a role in the determination of cross-holdings of assets.
Caveats, Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we first developed a theoretical model that suggests that countries more deeply enmeshed in international environmental arrangements should also find it easier to engage in international economic exchange with the rest of the world. We then showed that two countries with a joint interest in the environment should also find it easier to sustain large crossholdings of assets, since each can punish the other in one domain for transgressions in a different domain. We then tested these ideas, using a recent cross-section of international asset holdings, and environmental commitments. Our empirics verify the significance of both effects, especially the first; multilateral environmental engagement facilitates international economic exchange. A panel data set with bank loans and FDI provides further corroboration of our results, and our results are insensitive to a number of features of our methodology, including the assumption that IEA participation is either exogenous or correctly measured.
Is there a cost to "going it alone"? Is it costly for countries to ignore international environmental agreements? Yes. Countries have varying degrees of foreign engagement. Some are deeply enmeshed in defense alliances, environmental treaties, and international organizations; others are not. Above and beyond the direct consequences of such entanglements, we have found in this paper that countries with greater IEA participation also have higher trade in assets. Thus membership in international institutions brings indirect benefits; not joining such partnerships has costs. We chose to examine international environmental arrangements as one example of non-economic interactions. However, there are a variety of other domains in which countries interact; security arrangements and international organizations come to mind immediately.
If our assertions are correct, they have consequences for policy. For example, the debate on American participation in the Kyoto Protocol was framed in terms of the costs and benefits to the United States of participation in that treaty. If participation in such organizations also conveys indirect economic benefits, these externalities should not be ignored.
A number of questions remain: First, does bad behavior in the economic sphere (e.g., We leave such fascinating questions for future research. (01) .33* (.17) Dependent variable: log consolidated bank claims (million $), or log outward FDI stock from OECD (million $). Annual data spanning 1983-1999 for 206 countries. Country-pair-specific (dyadic) fixed effect estimation (except where noted). Coefficient is effect on #joint/host/source environmental treaties. Standard errors in parentheses; coefficients that are significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) are marked with one (two) asterisk(s). Regressors included but not recorded: log population (both host and source); log real GDP per capita (both host and source); log product of areas; dummies for #landlocked, #islands, common language, common colonizer, common country, colonial history; and time-specific dummies. Instrumental variables for #joint environmental treaties are: a) product of source and host country CO2 emissions; b) product of source and host organic water pollution; c) product of source and host country particle emissions. Instrumental variables for # source/ host environmental treaties are: a) # of source/host country CO2 emissions; b) # of source/host organic water pollution; c) # of source/host country particle emissions. 
Endnotes
1 A cautionary note: there is little evidence of punishment of any form for transgressions in international economic exchange. However, as our model is deterministic, punishment is not observed along equilibrium paths. 2 In practice, evidence of punishment of any form for transgressions in international economic exchange is limited, and the form of punishment posited in this paper is no exception. Still, there are a number of recent examples of perceived linkages across different categories of commitments: In 2004, Argentine President Kirchner addressed a Kyoto Protocol conference, saying it was "unacceptable" that third-world countries should be held to the terms of their outstanding debts while first-world countries, such as the United States, had failed to fulfill their obligations to stop global warming. The speech implied a link between political cooperation and international credit relationships. In the case of trade relationships, we also see evidence of spillovers with non-economic partnerships. For example, Russian President Putin openly tied Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to European Union support for Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. 3 There have been other approaches to the challenge raised by Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) . Some have concentrated on the ability of another creditor to step in and allow for self-finance subsequent to default. Eaton (1996) and Kletzer and Wright (2000) examine the implications of limiting the commitment capabilities of creditors in sovereign debt models to the level of their debtors. Wright (2002) concentrates on the possibility that the alternative Swiss bankers may not be available for the pursuit of self-finance if creditors find it optimal to collude against a borrower with a history of default. Krueger and Uhlig (2003) examine relationships where creditors have the ability to commit to making contingent payments, but there is a positive cost of initiating a credit relationship that limits a borrower's ability to switch creditors subsequent to a default. All of these generalizations concerning alternative financing opportunities defang the Bulow-Rogoff problem sufficiently to allow sovereign borrowing to reemerge. 4 We considered adding an interactive term to our empirical specification to allow the number of jointly-held treaties between two countries to be of decreasing importance with the distance between those countries. However, this specification encountered empirical challenges as this interactive term was highly correlated with the raw number of jointly-held treaties, one of our variables of interest. As such, we left geographic considerations for future research. 5 In our data set, there are simultaneous bilateral portfolio investments in each direction. We make no attempt to motivate these here, as for our purposes it is sufficient that foreign investors exist who are willing to make investments as long as the expected rate of return meets or exceeds some minimal rate, which we set at the risk free rate here (without loss of generality). However, one could motivate these cross-haulings of portfolio investments in terms of diversification motives. 6 We allow for selective default to ease comparison with the bilateral analysis that follows. Given that the government makes the default decision, private agents may attempt to "overborrow" in excess of the amount that would be consistent with maintaining the aggregate credit constraints, as in Jeske (2006) . We implicitly assume here that private creditors have knowledge of aggregate borrowing levels when making their lending decisions, and thereby avoid violation of the constraint. Alternative mechanisms to avoid overborrowing on the borrower side include having the government coordinate overall borrowing levels, as in Jeske (2006) , or to induce private internalization of the aggregate borrowing externality through a subsidy policy, as in Wright (2006) . 7 The relationship between government and private default decisions is typically associated with the so-called "sovereign ceiling," which limits a private borrower's creditworthiness to less than or equal to the perceived creditworthiness of the borrower's government. This ceiling is motivated by episodes such as the 1982 Mexican default, which applied to all public and private Mexican obligations. In practice, the relationship between sovereign and private ratings is more complicated, as ratings on top private issues sometimes exceed the values assigned to issues by their sovereign. Still, these public and private issues are highly correlated, suggesting the perception that default risk on public and private obligations is linked. 8 The endowment implicitly includes a number of arguments that we take as exogenous to the government's default decision, including net proceeds from foreign investments. 9 Our specification implicitly sets a zero penalty on debt default for notational simplicity. However, we could easily extend our analysis to include penalties for debt default as well. Under this alternative specification, countries could sustain some level of positive borrowing without any IEA participation, but the amount of borrowing that could be sustained would still be increasing in both unilateral and multilateral IEA participation. 10 This raises the possibility that a country might join more than its optimal number of IEAs in order to signal (misleadingly) that it is more patient, and thus ease its credit ceiling. We derive the conditions necessary to rule out this pooling equilibrium in an appendix.
